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Consumer Injuries and the Uses of Contract
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EDWARD
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The legal history of personal injury claims in late nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century America lies not only in the law of torts
but equally, if not more importantly, in the law of contracts. The
bulk of that history, moreover, lies not in formal judgments of
courts but in private decisions of injury victims to waive, settle, or
abandon their claims without judicial resolution. A major part of
that out-of-court process, in turn, consisted not of freely bargained
agreements that occurred randomly but rather of pressured settlements that were harvested systematically. To a large and insufficiently unexplored extent, the legal history of personal injury
claims lies in the organized release-seeking practices of thousands
upon thousands of corporate lawyers, doctors, and claim agents
who secured quick and low-cost settlements in countless numbers
of homes, streets, offices, roadways, factories, vehicles, and hospitals where injury victims and their families were found.
The years from the 1870s to the 1940s constituted a distinct
period in the development of corporate settlement practices.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a rapid increase
in commercially related accidents and the emergence of a plaintiffs' personal injury bar coincided with the nationalization of the
economy and the rationalization of corporate management techniques to spur a systematic use of releases to pre-empt potential
tort claims. By the end of the century the methodical and aggressive new practices were in widespread use. Then, in the early years
of the twentieth century, continued expansion of the plaintiffs'
personal injury bar and the growth of labour unions and consumer groups increased the de facto access of tort victims to
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counsel, while popular attitudes increasingly supported the idea
that injured persons should be more fully compensated. Both
courts and legislatures moved to strengthen the legal position of
those who sought to sue corporate defendants. Beginning in the
1920s, the numbers of commercially related accidents declined,
and insurance coverage expanded rapidly, spreading costs, bringing financial predictability, and decreasing the pressure on corporations to terminate adverse tort claims for the barest possible
amounts. By the mid-twentieth century, corporate settlement
practices-especially those of large insurance companies and
their well-protected clients-had become increasingly bureaucratized and routinized. The result was to moderate some of the
companies' most objectionable practices, raise the general level of
compensation paid, and increase somewhat the regularity with
which the de facto tort compensation system operated.
A consideration of corporate release-seeking practices highlights a major gap that has marked the history of personal injury
litigation. From the turn of the century corporate spokespersons
decried the work of 'ambulance chasers' and complained about
a purported flood of frivolous and fraudulent claims. 1 Many
lawyers and bar associations joined the attack, denouncing the
'abuses' fostered by contingent fee agreements and the ethical failures of personal injury attorneys. Similarly, much contemporary
law and economics literature follows the same track, focusing on
frivolous 'strike' and 'nuisance' suits. 2 While such commentary has
raised important issues, it has also largely ignored significant elements of the de facto litigation and settlement process. One, for
example, is the abusive tactics that corporations utilized. '[W]hen
we are for the defendant', explained one corporate lawyer, 'nothil).g
can start us. ' 3 They delayed cases, raised frivolous defences, filed
excessive motions and appeals, and tried numerous other similar
tactics to compound plaintiffs' burdens and raise their costs.
Another element often ignored is the fraudulent and unethical
1
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction in Industrial
America, 1870-1958 (New York, 1992), 150-4 and sources cited therein.
2
See, e.g., Lucien Aryc Bebchuk, 'Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer', Journal
ef Legal Studies, 17 (1988), 437-50.
3
Quoted in Sol M. Linowitz, The Betrayed Prqfession: Lawyering at the End ef the Twentieth
Century (New York, 1992), 25. On the importance of building a litigation 'reputation', see,
e.g., Samuel R. Gross and Kent D. Syverud, 'Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial', Michigan Law Review, 90 (1991), 319-93.

The Action was outside the Courts

behaviour of defendants. From 1889 to 1902, for example, the
Metropolitan Street Railway Company of New York paid thousands of dollars in bribes to doctors, witnesses, court personnel,
and police officers in order to defeat countless numbers of
claimants. Eventually, after its practices were exposed, the
company admitted that its legal department had been 'a perjury
mill'. 4 A third such element, which this essay explores, is the
methodical solicitation of inequitable out-of-court settlements.
Indeed, corporate release-seeking practices helped stimulateeven necessitated-'ambulance chasing'. If plaintiffs' lawyers did
not reach injury victims quickly, corporate agents would have their
signatures on releases. No adequate understanding of the litigation and settlement process is possible without a consideration of
such social factors.

Consumers and claiming
In the decades around the turn of the century industrial accidents
caused approximately 35,000 deaths and almost 2 million injuries
per year. 5 For 'consumers' as a growing and identifiable social
group, injuries resulted from contacts with a nearly infinite variety
of objects, products, vehicles, activities, and facilities. For half a
century the railroads injured 5,000-10,000 passengers every year
and annually caused the death of several hundred more. 6 In the
decade from 1887 to 1896 streetcars in New York City averaged
some 140 accidents per year, while,in Boston trolley accidents rose
from just over 200 in 1887 to more \han 1,700 in 1900. 7 Other new
urban services similarly caused untold numbers of accidents. Gas
and electricity accounted for twenty-eight deaths in Boston in 1900,
and gas alone caused 142 deaths in New York City ten years later. 8
4
In re Robinson, 136 NYS 548 (App. Div. 1st NY 1912), qj]irmed 103 NE 160 (Ct. App. NY
1913); New York State Bar Association, 'Report of Committee on Contingent Fees', Proceedings ef the Thirty-First Annual Meeting (1908), 121.
5
Lawrence M. Friedman, A History ef American Law (2nd edn., New York, 1985), 482.
r; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics ef
the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, 1975), pt. 2, 740.
7
W. J. Clark, 'A Chapter of Accidents', Street Railway Journal, 13 (Oct. 1897), 667-70,
669; Robert A. Silverman, Law and Urban Growth: Civil Litigation in the Boston Trial Courts,
1880-1900 (Princeton, 1981), 101.
8
Silverman, Law and Urban Growth, 108; Randolph E. Bergstrom, Courting Danger: Injury
and Law in .New York City, 1870-1910 (Ithaca, NY, 1992), 51.
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Although the conditions of late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century life created literally millions of potential tort
claims, the courts disposed of relatively few of them. Most never
became lawsuits, and a majority of those that did were settled
without final legal judgment. In one way or another, out-of-court
resolutions accounted for more than 90 per cent of all potential
tort claims and well over half of those that were filed in court. 9
There are few reliable statistics, but it seems likely that, compared to injured workers, at least, consumers as a group converted
a somewhat higher-though still relatively small-percentage of
their potential claims into lawsuits and may have prosecuted a
slightly higher percentage of those suits to judgment. 1°Consumers
were generally free from the kinds of social and economic pressures that corporate employers used so effectively to discourage
suits by their own employees, 11 and they often had little to lose
and much to gain, especially if their injuries were serious and
contingent fee arrangements allowed them counsel. Further, again
as compared to injured workers, consumers occupied a more
favoured legal position. They did not have to confront the daunting fellow-servant defence, and they could often avoid difficult evidentiary problems by invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Finally, some consumers-principally passengers on elevators and
escalators, amusement park rides, taxicabs, railroads, streetcars,
and buses-enjoyed an especially favoured position. Common
carriers owed them not merely the standard duty of 'reasonable
care' but rather a much more rigorous duty of 'the highest care'.
That higher standard meant tl;rnt injured passengers could more
commonly and economically.,Prove the carriers' liability. Moreover, in the frequent cases that involved collisions, derailments,
explosions, and other mechanical failures, carriers were deprived
of two of their most powerful defences, contributory negligence
and assumption of risk.
'' Frank M. Munger, Jr., 'Miners and Lawyers: Law Practice and Class Conflict in
Appalachia, 1872-1920', in Maureen Cain and Christine B. Harrington (eds.), Uiwyers in a
Postmodern World: Translation and Tran1gressio11 (New York, 1994), 185-228, 2IO, 228 n. 42;
Purcell, Litigation and Inequality, 32-3, 259-60.
10
Lawrence M. Friedman, 'Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late 19th
Century', American Bar Foundation Research Journal (1987), 351-77, 367.
11
Social and economic vulnerability and the fear of employer retaliation made workers
extremely reluctant to sue their employers for tort compensation. Munger, 'Miners and
Lawyers', 209-11, 227 n. 40, 228 n. 43; Purcell, Litigation and Inequality, 37-42.
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Corporate defendants: incentives and leverage
Whatever the exact percentage who brought suit, corporate defendants worked painstakingly to keep as many tort victims as possible out of court. A handbook for railroad accountants emphasized
the importance of settling claims without judicial involvement.
While a corporate legal staff handled a variety of problems, it
explained, a 'very large part of its duty is to effect settlement of
disputes outside of court,' especially in 'personal injury' cases. 12 A
streetcar company announced bluntly that its policy was 'to settle
all accident cases promptly, and never allow them to reach the
courts if we can possibly prevent it'. 13
Powerful economic incentives spurred corporate efforts to settle
out of court. Potential tort claims threatened regular and substantial economic exposure.'+ Transportation companies, in particular, had compelling economic incentives to settle adverse
claims. They tended to be involved in large numbers of personal
injuries, and often their fault was clear and no legal defence available. In such cases out-of-court settlements constituted the bestand perhaps only-opportunity to resolve claims for relatively
minimal amounts. 15 Further, railroad and streetcar companies
were often under acute financial pressure, and they sought avidly
to trim their variable costs wherever possible.
An additional economic incentive may also have inspired corporate settlement efforts. Some scholars have maintained that
common law judges sought economically 'efficient' results. They
maintain, that is, that the courts tended to hold defendants liable
for negligence only when the 'costs' of preventing an injury were
less than the 'costs' of the injury itself discounted by its likelihood
of occurrence. If they are right, that common law dynamic
created a compelling economic incentive for corporate defendants
to press for minimal settlements. For, by holding down settlement amounts generally, they could help create and maintain a
widespread perception that the 'costs' of injuries-a subjective,
socially generated criterion-were and should be quite low. By

" J. Shirley Eaton, Handbook ef Railroad Expenses (New York,

1913), 197-8.
Quoted in Friedman, 'Civil Wrongs', at 371.
11
Sec, e.g., M. L. Byers, Economics qf Railway Operation (New York, 1908), 566-9; Eaton,
Handbook, 81-83, Il5-17, 187-91, 197-8.
15
Friedman, 'Civil Wrongs', at 375; Bergstrom, Courting Danger, at 158-60.
13
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minimizing the generally perceived 'costs' of injuries they could
ensure that the applicable negligence formula would shrink the scope
of their potential liability and thereby reduce the overall number
of cases where the law would require them to pay damages. 16
Driven to minimize the cost of claims, corporate defendants
came quickly to recognize the advantages of out-of-court settlements. Most fundamental, they learned that such settlements
could often be arranged easily and cheaply if accomplished immediately after an accident. Victims were frequently in no condition
to negotiate knowingly or effectively. Often they were alone, in
shock or pain, disoriented and frightened, and ignorant of both
their legal options and the extent of their injuries. Above all, their
immediate and overwhelming concern was to obtain proper
medical treatment. The victim of a Santa Fe Railway collision,
for example, who had received cuts, bruises, a broken leg, and a
fractured skull, signed a release in the railroad's hospital four days
after the accident. The victim 'did not seem to care' about 'the
matter of dollars and cents', the agent who secured the agreement
testified. 'All he wanted was to have proper care.' 17 Sometimes,
injury victims were preoccupied with the condition of another
member of their family who had also been injured. Sometimes,
they were emotionally shaken but deeply relieved-and therefore
pliable-because they had apparently not been injured more seriously. 'I was glad to save my life,' explained one injured worker
who signed a release shortly after his injury. 18 An insurance
company official acknowledged the obvious. 'In settling claims
considerable money can be saved if done in the early stages before
the case falls into the hands of an attorney.' 19
While corporations held overwhelming advantages in dealing
with accident victims immediately after their injury, they also had
other advantages they could use against those who resisted settlement. First, corporations learned that most injury victims were
unable to bear the burdens of litigation. If companies insisted on
'" Sec, e.g., Richard A. Posner, 'A Theory of Negligence', Journal ef Legal Studies, l (1972),
29. Cf. Bergstrom, Courting Danger, 167-96.
17
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Cunningham, 54 P. w55, w57 (Sup. Ct. Kan.
1898).
111
United States House of Representatives, Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 ef the Committee on the Judiciary ef the House ef Representatives, Bo Cong., l sess. (1947), 72.
19
Quoted in Roy Lubovc, 'Workmen's Compensation and the Prerogatives of Voluntarism', Labor History, 8 (1967), 254, 26o n. 15.
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their non-liability while making low settlement offers, they could
compel injured individuals to choose between a quick, easy, and
cost-free resolution and a risky, expensive, and protracted litigation. They knew that potential plaintiffs were balked by any
number of practical obstacles: psychological inability to face confrontation, ignorance of the judicial system, fear of the company
or its representatives, unfamiliarity with-or deep distrust of-lawyers, a desperate need for money to pay medical expenses and
provide for their families, knowledge that attorneys' fees would
consume much of any award they might win, the costs of retaining expert witnesses and locating and assuring the timely appearance of fact witnesses, the innumerable risks and uncertainties
involved in litigation and trial, the costs and delays of the nearly
inevitable appeal that would follow any plaintiff's victory, and,
finally, the cumulating personal and family pressures that years of
waiting for a final legal judgment could generate. 20 By the late
nineteenth century corporate defendants had learned that those
pressures would combine relentlessly to make most claimants
falter and eventually succumb to discounted settlement offers.
They understood, in short, the uses and forms of strategic cost
imposition. 21
Second, corporations also learned to use their economic.leverage. They had relatively fixed legal costs and handled large
numbers of cases and, consequently, were able to spread the
higher costs of the relatively few cases they chose to litigate over
the much larger number they settled. In contrast, individual
claimants bore the entire cost of their litigations and had to pay
for them out of whatever proceeds resulted from their single suit.
Moreover, because corporate defendants had legal costs that were
budgeted, relatively fixed, and spread over a large base, they were
not subject to significant economic pressure by any action that an
adversary might take in filing, litigating, trying, or appealing a
20
See, e.g., Austin Sarat, 'Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey
Evidence', Law and Sociery Review, 11 (1977), 427-88, 436, 448-52, 464-5, 466-72; David M.
Engel, 'Cases, Conflict, and Accommodation: Patterns of Legal Interaction in an American Community', American Bar Foundation Research Journal (1983), 803-74, 816-22, 851;
Purcell, Litigation and lnequaliry, chs. 2 and 3.
21
Kathleen Engelmann and Bradford Cornell, 'Measuring the Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies', Journal ef Legal Studies, 17 (1988), 377-99; Keith N. Hylton, 'Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law', Universiry ef Miami Law Review, 46
(1991), 111-48.
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claim. Further, knowing that most claims would ultimately settle,
they could generally be indifferent to the fate of any individual
case, 22 a position that strengthened their resolve to stand firm on
low settlement offers. Finally, their permanent legal staffs and substantially lowered per-case costs meant that corporate defendants
could, when necessary, allocate extensive resources to litigate specific and troublesome disputes. That capability, in turn, enabled
them to drive up the costs of those claimants who chose to litigate seriously-thereby devaluing their claims-and to increase
their own chances of winning in court. 23 Corporations utilized,
in short, the strategic advantages they held as the least costly
litigators.
To obtain quick releases, corporate defendants organized
special claims departments and retained networks of agents across
the country. 'These cases constitute so regular and large a group,
and are so nearly similar', explained a railroad accounting
handbook, 'that they result in specialization with regular staffs
to handle them.' 24 One of the first responsibilities of a corporate
legal staff, announced a study of railroad economics, was '[t]he
settling of claims for personal injury'. 25 A streetcar company
explained that it instructed its agents to 'hunt up' injury victims,
get in their 'good graces', and 'insist on paying [them] something'
to get their signatures on releases. 26
Those regular staffs and individual agents enjoyed wide discretion in conducting their operations. They had one clear goal-to
obtain quick and inexpensive settlements-and one clear test of
success-whether or not they got the desired releases. They could
choose their tactics, adapt their approach to any situation, and
22
Corporate attorneys would ensure the settlement--generously, if necessary-of suits
that were legally or prudentially indefensible or that threatened to alter the law in an
unfavourable direction. See, e.g., Wayne V Mcintosh, The Appeal of Civil Law: A Political&onomic Ana!Jisis of Litigation (Urbana, Ill. 1990), 146.
"' Sec Stanton Wheeler, Bliss Cartwright, Robert A. Kagan, and Lawrence M. Friedman, 'Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts,
1870-1970', Law and Society Review, 21 (1987), 403-45, 439-40; Mcintosh, Appeal of Civil Law,
146, 150·-1. For defendants' legal/ economic advantages, see Robert D. Cooter and Daniel
L. RubinfCld, 'Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and their Resolution', Journal of Economic Literature, 27 (1989), rn67, rn73-4; Martin J. Bailey and Paul H. Rubin, 'A Positive
Theory of Legal Change', International Review of Law and Economics, 14 (1994) 467-77.
24
Eaton, Handbook, 197-8. Compare R. W. Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism,
1825-1875 (Oxford, 1994), app., 373-88.
"'' Byers, Economics of Railway Operation, 566.
26
Quoted in Friedman, 'Civil Wrongs', at 371.
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rely on the fact that their statements would go unrecorded. Their
positions gave them both the opportunity and incentive to pressure claimants immediately, vigorously, and tenaciously. Their
employers profited from their successes and had little or no economic incentive to supervise them closely or to restrain their
tactics. Individual tort claimants held no significance as regular
customers or suppliers, and they seldom possessed any social or
economic leverage against their corporate adversaries. Neither the
companies nor their agents had any noticeable incentive to cultivate their goodwill. The companies devoted few resources to constrain their agents, and the agents quickly learned the most
efficient methods available to bring in the largest number of settlements at the lowest possible cost. 27

Practice
Reported release cases do not merely state the law. They also
record something quite different: the operation of an alternative
corporate legal process-massive, organized, profitable, and
largely invisible to the public. 28 They reveal the companies' standard tactics, their frequent successes, and the substantial savings
they reaped. They suggest, further, both the relative unimportance
of substantive legal norms and the decisive importance 'of the
27
Economic and rational choice th<:ories support this conclusion. Sec, e.g., Cooter and
Rubinfeld, 'Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes', w78--86. See Carl Gcrsuny, Work
Hazards and Industrial Coriflict (Hanover, NH, 1981).
28
There was an interesting split in the period's legal literature. Judges and practitioners frequently referred to organized and aggressive agent tactics, but the university law
reviews were largcly silent on the subject. Revealingly, when the law reviews discussed
releases, they did so with an almost exclusive focus on matters of doctrine and 'logic'.
Indeed, they directed most of their efforts to a critique of a single topic, the 'joint tortfcasors rule'. Obviously dysfunctional and unfair, the rule lent itself readily to a sharp doctrinal critique; e.g., note, Harvard Law Review, 28 (1915), 802-4; note, Yale Law Journal, 28
(1918), 90-1; Michigan Law Review, 18 (1920), 680-+ Only rarely, and well after the turn of
the century, did the law reviews discuss the significance of organized corporate release
practices: e.g., note, Univmiry ef Chicago Law Review, 5 (1938), 455-63. This difference
between the courts and the law reviews suggests, again, that legal 'formalism' was a relatively limited phenomenon, that the bench was generally sensitive to the law's social
context, and that there was much less congruence than often assumed between the 'mentalities' of some 'high formalists' on the one hand (e.g. the discussion of releases in Samuel
Willston, The Law ef Contracts, vol. iii (New York, 1929), 3138-208) and large numbers of
judges and practitioners on the other. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., review of G. Edward
White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Journal ef Southern History, 61 (1995), 620, 622.
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social characteristics of the parties in determining who received
compensation and how much they received.
The single most obvious and important characteristic of corporate practices was the sheer speed with which claim agents
acted. Repeatedly, the courts criticized their 'unseemly haste'. 29
Claim agents, declared a lawyers' magazine in 1905, 'fly with
the wings of an eagle to the scene of the accident'. 30 The VicePresident of the American Electric Railway Association acknowledged that corporations sought 'the immediate settlement of
accidents and damages'. Indeed, companies should provide their
claims agents with a ready cash 'Working Fund', he advised, so
that their agents could settle cases without having to 'wait until
the regular check and voucher can be received'. 31 The railroads
sometimes held trains in place until their claims agents arrived
and secured the desired releases. One court, for example, criticized a railroad for
[h]olding the train, sending for a law agent to make a settlement before
any medical or other attention was given [the injured person], and when
she was suffering from [a concussion of the brain and spine], and, if conscious, giving her attention to her little, bleeding grandson. 32

The railroads took injured passengers to company hospitals
where their claim agents had ready access to them; they placed
agents on board their trains to secure releases from them while
they travelled; and they stationed agents in waiting at passengers'
down-line transfer or destination points. Railroad, streetcar,
taxicab, and bus companies took injured passengers to depots or
company offices or tracked them to nearby hospitals or doctors'
offices. Within days of accidents-sometimes hours-agents
arrived at the doors of injured persons' homes or resting places
seeking their signatures on releases. Immediate contact with
injured persons and control of the post-injury situation was
designed to exploit the uncertainty, confusion, and anguish that
followed in the immediate wake of personal injuries. In 1908 the
New York State Bar Association castigated
''' e.g. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. Lewis, 109 Ill. 120, 134 (1884).
30
Editorial note, Virginia Law Register, 11 (1905), 843.
31
lrville Augustus May, Street Railway Accounting: A Manual ef Operating Practice far Electric
Railways (New York, 1917), 253.
32
Southern Railway Co. in Kentucky v. Brewer, 105 SW 160, 163 (Ct. App. Ky. 1907).
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the practice, now become notorious, of unscrupulous agents of railroad
corporations seeking out injured persons, and, through chicanery and
fraud, obtaining from them, in the moment of their pain and suffering,
releases on insufficient consideration. 33

The releases that such victims signed were almost invariably for
steeply discounted amounts, often for small or wholly token
payments.
Incessant pressure was the second major characteristic of corporate settlement practices. Agents hounded potential claimants
to sign releases. They pressured them with repeated visits to their
hospitals and homes; they told them that they had to leave town
and that there could be no settlement if the victims waited; and
they persistently pressed them to sign releases regardless of their
feelings, prior refusals, and uncertain medical conditions. 'The
agent of the company who approached [an injured passenger]
was notified by her nurses and attendants that she was not in
a mental and physical condition to attend to any business', the
Supreme Court of Georgia explained in one case, 'but he insisted
on an interview or settlement.' 34 The Eighth Circuit described
the case of an injured man in the hospital under the influence of
narcotics:
Three or four days after the accident, while this [narcotics] treatment
was going on, and while his arms were suspended over a rope stretched
across his bed in order to relieve the pressure upon his injured spine, and
when he was tortured and racked with physical pain (when not under
the influence of opiates), the defendant's agents found their way into his
sickroom, from which his friends and all others, save his nurses, had been
excluded, by order of his physician. 35

The Wisconsin Supreme Court described the actions of an agent
who secured a release from a 66-year-old woman by making a
number of false representations:
He succeeded in getting her to sign by high-pressure methods during
a siege at her bedside in the hospital, from 7:30 to 9:30 p.m., within
seventy-five hours after she had been injured. She was badly shocked,
33
New York State Bar Association, 'Report of Committee on Contingent Fees', Proceedings ef the Thirty-First Annual Meeting (1908), rn3.
34
Smith v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 6z SE 673, 674 (Sup. Ct. Ga. 1908).
35
Union Pacific Railwqy Co. v. Harris, 63 F. 800, 803 (CCA 8th 1894), qffirmed 158 US 326
(1895).
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and grievously hurt, her hip was fractured, the pain was excruciating,
she was dazed, confused, mortified, and embarrassed ... While she was
in an exhausted and distressed condition, packed in sand bags to keep
her hip immobile, and racked with pain and under the influences of
sedatives and hypnotics, the adjuster, whom she had never known,
entered her room without her permission. 36

Agents of one railroad secured a release by making the injured
person's mark and having him touch the pen while he 'was lying
in his bed, the morning after his foot had been amputated, under
the influence of opiates'. 37 Another agent persuaded a doctor to
suspend his examination and treatment of an injured passengerwho 'was suffering severe pain'-while he secured his signature
on a release. 38 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that
another claimant 'was in the hospital, suffering from his injuries,
and was unconscious, at the time it is alleged the release was
signed by him'. 39
The third major characteristic of corporate settlement practices
was their methodical and often ruthless opportunism. Agents
reached agreements not only with persons suffering great physical and emotional distress, but also with those who were elderly,
illiterate, unable to speak or understand the English language, and
under the influence of some type of drug or alcohol given as a
painkiller. They attempted to deal with injured persons while they
were alone, often trying to keep others out of the room while they
obtained their signatures. Some succeeded in getting releases from
parties with attorneys by dealing with them alone and without
their attorneys' knowledge. One railroad treated a female passenger, gave her narcotics, and placed her on a train in a locked
car with several of its agents. 40
Claim agents used a variety of dubious techniques. They offen~d
jobs with the company and promised to 'take care of' victims if
their injuries proved more serious than they appeared. They tried
to divide potential claimants and use them against one another.
They apparently switched or misrepresented documents or altered
3
"

37
38
39
40

Allison v. Wm. Doerflinger Co., 242 NW 558, 561 (Sup. Ct. Wisc. 1932).
Jones v. Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Co., 16 So. 379, 380 (Sup. Ct. Miss. 1894).
Spring/ieUJ Consolidated Railway Co. v. Picket, 125 Ill. App. 519 (Ct. App. 3d Ill. 1906).
McCaw v. Union Traction Co., 54 A. 893, 895 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1903).
St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Co. v. Phillips, 66 F. 35, 37-8 (CCA 8th

1895).
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the terms of the agreements they had negotiated when they presented written releases for signature. A street railway employee told
an injured woman that 'she would be kicked off the car' unless she
signed a release, 41 while a claim agent bought a victim six drinks
in a bar before obtaining his signature. 42 Another agent used
the captivating lure of, literally, a pile of money. He 'came to the
meeting with a general release all prepared, except filling blanks,
and with 100 $5 bills, which at some time during the negotiation
were laid in a pile on the table before the [injured person]'. 43
Again, claim agents quickly gathered and then used whatever
relevant information they could discover. They interviewed doctors who had treated injured persons, apparently violating the
patients' rights to confidentiality, and obtained valuable medical
information that could help the company in future lawsuits. More
immediately, they used such medical information directly, telling
injured persons about their conversations and claiming that the
victims' own doctors regarded their injuries as minor or temporary. Similarly, agents interviewed both victims and potential
witnesses, obtaining additional information both to pressure
claimants for settlements and to prepare for litigation. Together
with regular company employees, they asked passengers to sign '
reports about the nature and cause of their injuries, securing
potentially powerful admissions to undercut subsequent claims.
Their efforts, too, were comprehensive. They insisted on getting
releases even from those who believed they had not been injured
or who disclaimed any desire for compensation. The agents
pressed them to accept token payments in order to cover possible
injury to their clothing, parcels, or baggage; they insisted that
they take small amounts of money to compensate for whatever
'expenses' or 'inconveniences' they might have suffered. Sometimes, the agents offered the money as a purported 'gift' or 'donation'. The signed agreements that they obtained in return proved
invariably to be complete releases for claims of all varieties,
including personal injuries. Frequently, such releases precluded
subsequent suits by those who later realized or learned that they
had, in fact, suffered significant injuries.
41

42
43

Dalmage v. Crow, 49 NYS 1004 (City Ct. NY 1898).
Logue v. Philadelphia RapUJ Transit Co., 78 Pa. Sup. Ct. 239 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1922).
Barrett v. Lewiston, Brunswick & Bath Street Railway Co., 85 A. 306, 308 (Sup. Jud. Ct.

Me. 1912).
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A 1929 Texas case was both typical and revealing. In Bankers'
Health & Accident Co. ef America v. Shadden, 44 the court found that
an agent's own testimony 'conclusively demonstrated' his fraudulent behaviour. He had preyed
upon a widow of limited education without training in matters of business, wholly unacquainted with the exclusions, inclusions, and highly
technical phrases of an accident insurance policy, with practically no
understanding or comprehension of the facts involved, or her legal rights
thereunder, and over whom the clouds of bereavement, by reason of her
husband's recent death, were still hovering.

Among other statements, the agent admitted telling the woman
that he had studied the policy and that it simply did not cover her
husband. He threatened that 'if you don't make a settlement with
me, you are going to have to fight with my company and they are
not going to pay you a dime'. He insisted further that 'if you go
to an attorney with this, your attorney won't get enough of it to
pay their [sic] fee'. Finally, as his emotional coup de grace, he
informed the grieving widow that 'where there is any doubt about
an accident they remove the body from the grave and have it
examined'. 45 Two aspects of the case are particularly significant.
First, the agent testified freely about his tactics, evidencing his
belief that they were wholly ordinary and legitimate. Second, he
also testified that he had been a claim agent for twenty-six years. 46
Together, those two facts suggest that manipulative and unscrupulous practices were in common use and that they affected thousands upon thousands of victims whose claims never reached the
courts.
Innumerable cases support those conclusions. It was a railroad's
division superintendent, for example, who secured a release within
eighteen hours of an accident by twice meeting with a woman
who had a fractured shoulder blade and was in a state of shock. 47
An agent with fifteen years' experience secured the release of a
woman's claims by bringing her husband's supervisor to the
meeting where he negotiated the settlement. The supervisor, who
'had authority to retain or discharge' the husband, told the wife
44
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that 'it would be better for them to sign the release'. 48 Again, it
was the 'chief special claim agent' of an insurance company who
felt free to adopt an even more dramatic tactic. Trying to settle a
$2,500 life insurance policy for $soo, the agent left the attorney
of the widow-beneficiary and, contrary to his promise, went
directly to the woman's home. Alone with her, he used a series of
false statements and threats to coerce a release. 49
The fourth major characteristic of corporate settlement practices-especially of railroad and streetcar companies-was the
maintenance of company hospitals and doctors. Claim agents sent
or accompanied injured persons to company physicians and facilities, and in countless other cases company doctors turned up at
the accident scene or, shortly thereafter, visited victims at their
homes or hospitals. In some cases, even though injured persons
had already received emergency medical care or were under treatment by their own physicians, the company doctors came to
examine and treat them anyway.
The ready availability of medical care minimized victims' suffering and often prevented more serious injuries, but the benevolence was grounded in well-understood corporate interests.
'Medical and hospital service', a railroad accounting handbook
explained, 'is of the nature of preventive measures to avoid when
possible more serious injuries or fatalities with the consequent
heavier damages. ' 5°Company doctors were also superb discovery
instruments. By conducting their own examination of victims,
they prepared themselves to testify on the basis of first-hand
knowledge and gained critical information that would otherwise
have been unavailable to their companies prior to trial. Finally,
and probably most important, by becoming the victims' physicians
and tending their injuries, company doctors earned both their
gratitude and their confidence. When they advised patients that
their injuries were minor or temporary, they eased their worries
and raised their hopes. When they supported, directly or indirectly, the constant importuning of the ever-present claim agents,
they helped induce their patients to settle on the agents' terms.
The cases suggest that injured persons were often susceptible to
48
49
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the doctors' lead. Hurting, shocked, and distressed, they desperately wanted to believe that they would recover fully and that they
would shortly be back about their lives as if nothing had happened. When company agents and doctors told them that their
injuries were 'minor' and 'temporary', injury victims seized hungrily on such welcome news. Pressed to make decisions quickly,
they often opted to accept the happy future that was promised, or
at least dangled as a likelihood, and to go ahead and take the settlement offered.
In many cases company doctors participated in the effort to
obtain releases from their patients. Sometimes they initiated negotiations themselves, informing patients that they were not seriously
injured and urging them to settle quickly. Sometimes they introduced their patients to claim agents, and sometimes they merely
advised them to go and see the agents. Sometimes, apparently
when they were not formally company 'employees', they joined
with claim agents to seek quick releases so that the company would
pay for their services immediately. Such efforts nudged injury
victims towards settlement and, in many cases, gave them the
impression that accepting the agents' offer was the best-or only
-option available.
While company doctors did not always encourage settlement,
they were apparently expected never to discourage it. The
Supreme Court of Kansas focused on some critical testimony.
Several witnesses testified that the company doctor had told them
that his patient had come 'within a hair's breadth of breaking his
neck' and that he had 'intended to warn him against signing a
release of the railroad company'. He had not done so, however,
the doctor explained, because 'the claim agent was so near at hand
that he had no chance'. 51
The intrinsic conflict of interest that plagued company do~
tors repeatedly created situations that were at best ambiguous.
Company doctors made mistaken diagnoses and rendered opinions that proved to be overly optimistic, and they apparently failed
frequently to warn their patients about the dangers of future complications and disabilities. Even assuming their most scrupulous
good faith, they regularly and directly advanced their companies'
interests by the frequent support they gave for immediate settle51
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ments. With surprising frequency, the courts found that company
doctors had engaged in fraudulent behaviour and that they had
purposely or recklessly misled their patients in order to obtain
releases.

Social variations: gender and race in the
iriformal legal process
While company agents used a variety of tactics against mJury
victims, it seems likely that they were particularly effective in
securing releases from women and especially from blacks. 52 The
cases show that women were often subjected to some of the
agents' most intrusive and manipulative tactics. In a collision that
occurred around one or two in the morning, for example, agents
of one railroad pressured an injured woman all night long while
she 'was laboring under great nervous strain'. In addition to her
own injuries, 'she was greatly distressed and excited' because
'[h]er infant was injured about the head'. After hours of effort,
the agents finally secured her signature on a release 'about daybreak'. 53 The Supreme Court of Illinois described another female
passenger who
was in her private room at the hotel, suffering at the time the most
intense pain, was partly disrobed, and was being attended by a lady,-a
casual acquaintance,-who had been applying liniment to her person,
and was then combing her hair, when two strange men entered the room
to secure her signature to the paper. 5+

Another railroad agent arrived at a widow's home less than two
hours after she had viewed her husband's 'mutilated remains'
which had been found 'scattered along the track, the hands at one
place, the head at another, and the liver at another'. When she
confessed to the agent that her 'one thought' was to have her
husband's remains buried at his old home in another county, the
agent immediately seized the opportunity. He told her that
52
Cf. Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman, 'Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining
for a New Car', American Economic Review, 85/3 (1995), 304-21.
53
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Reilly, 161 SW rn52, rn53 (Sup. Ct.
Ark. 1913).
54
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. Lewis, rn9 Ill. 120, 132 (Sup. Ct. Ill.
1884).

522

EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.

if she did not sign a release to the railroad company, she would have to
bury her husband at her own expense; that he was in a hurry to get back
and notify the undertaker; that it was too great expense to bury her
husband at his old home; that the railroad company would do nothing
towards burying her husband but would 'hands off' unless she would
sign a release. He also stated that the railroad company was not liable
to her.

All of the agent's statements, the Supreme Court of Georgia subsequently found, were false. 55
If agents tried more often to bully and intimidate women,
female claimants who subsequently took their claims to court
sometimes received a particularly sympathetic hearing. The courts
often showed solicitude for widows, and they appeared willing to
give relatively heavy weight to the argument that women were not
responsible for signing releases because they possessed little or no
business experience. A Kentucky court affirmed a verdict for a
female plaintiff on the ground, inter alia, that she 'had no male
friend present to advise her' when she signed a release, 56 and the
Supreme Court of North Dakota did the same for a woman who
'was away from her husband and without legal advice'. 57
While gender sometimes won judicial sympathy for fem ale
plaintiffs, it often made no difference. Many women claimants
received not a whit of special consideration. The courts often
upheld the releases they contested, even when the circumstances
were dubious. Although the nature of the evidence makes any
conclusions tentative, it seems likely that claim agents frequently
exploited the special vulnerabilities of female injury victims and
that the courts remedied their abuses only erratically.
If women were relatively vulnerable to agent tactics, blacks suffered even more, especially in the South. First, as a practical
matter, the opportunity for blacks to pursue tort claims was problematic and even dangerous. Repression, intimidation, and violence were integral parts of southern race relations; and blacks
knew all too well the risk of offending whites for 'not knowing
·" Hixon v. Georgia Southern & Florida Railway Co., 137 SE 260, 261 (Sup. Ct. Ga. 1927).
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their place'. 58 Filing an action that reflected badly on a local
white-a small businessman, a corporate employee involved in the
injury, or a claim agent responsible for settling the matter-could
provoke social abuse, economic retaliation, or physical violence.
Second, most blacks were relatively poor and uneducated, and
they suffered as a group from high illiteracy rates. The inability
of large numbers to read and write increased their vulnerability
to white dishonesty. A black sharecropper who signed a highly disadvantageous contract remembered the lesson. '[I]f you didn't
understand it', he explained, 'they just took advantage of your
ignorance. ' 59 Finally, most blacks looked on what they called 'the
white folks' courthouse' with deep scepticism, if not outright hostility.60 In many southern and border states blacks could not serve
on juries, while black witnesses subjected themselves to unknown
extra-legal dangers and, in any event, risked the cold disbelief of
white juries. 61 There was also reason to believe that white juries
would not award large judgments to black plaintiffs. 62 Further, in
order to dare a court case blacks had little choice but to retain
white attorneys. As one white southern attorney remarked: 'Negro
lawyers do not get "good breaks" before white juries. ' 63 Thus, hazarding a lawsuit would most likely require a black to trust a white
attorney, as well as a white judge and white jury. Small wonder
that in his classic study, An American Dilemma, Gunnar M)rrdal concluded that as a practical matter most southern blacks were
'restricted to trying to settle things outside of court'. 64
111
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Given those conditions, it seems almost certain that corporate
claim agents, who lived on their ability to secure cut-rate releases,
leaned frequently and heavily on the lever of race. 'Any white man
can strike or beat a Negro, steal or destroy his property, cheat him
in a transaction and even take his life, without much fear of legal
reprisal,' Myrdal summarized. 'The minor forms of violencecheating and striking-are a matter of everyday occurrence. 'G 5
Race relations, especially in the South, created an ideal context
in which claim agents could ratchet up the social pressures they
applied and secure drastically discounted settlements. When
cornered by a white man and asked to sign an employment
agreement, a southern black reported, '[w]e would have signed
anything, just to get away'. 66
Especially striking was the aftermath of a Seaboard Air Lines
wreck in North Carolina in 1g1r. A special excursion train, scheduled for the annual outing of the St Joseph's African Methodist
Episcopal Sunday School, carried g12 blacks packed into seven
wooden coaches that had been designed to hold fifty people each.
When the special crashed into a slow-moving freight, ten blacks
were killed and another eighty-six injured, fifty-eight seriously.
The Seaboard was clearly responsible for the wreck and had no
legal defence to its passengers' claims. Immediately, the railroad
dispatched agents to the scene, and a local paper reported that
the resulting settlements ranged from $1 to $1,ooo.G7 Contemporaneously, a congressional study found that tort judgments for
injured railroad workers averaged more than $goo in cases involving temporary injuries, $z,500 in death cases, and from $4,000 to
$n,ooo in permanent disability cases. 68 Apparently, therefore, the
Seaboard's agents secured discounts of 80 to go per cent of the
judgment value of the claims.
More revealing is the fact that the Seaboard's payments were
low even compared to other out-of-court settlements. Such settlements, of course, were almost invariably lower than judgments,
and the same congressional study found that they averaged
approximately $70 for temporary injuries, $1,200 for both per65
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manent partial disability and death claims, and just under $4,000
for claims of permanent total disability. 69 Two powerful forces, of
course, helped keep those worker settlements relatively low: first,
employers often threatened their employees with sanctions,
including the loss of jobs, if they did not settle their claims readily;
and, second, employers had a battery of special legal defences that
made employee claims particularly unpromising. 70 The blacks
injured and killed in the Seaboard wreck, in contrast, confronted
neither of those compelling pressures and, indeed, occupied a
commanding legal position because the railroad seemed clearly
at fault. Regardless of those facts, however, the black passengers
apparently settled for amounts significantly lower than those that
the railroad workers obtained in their out-of-court agreements.
Indeed, the blacks in the Seaboard wreck obtained much less than
another group of passengers had received more than thirty years
earlier. In 1880 the West Jersey Railroad settled forty claims on
behalf of eighteen dead and twenty-two injured passengers for an
average of $1,270 per claim, probably at least double or triple the
average amount the blacks received. 71
While the calculus of race placed black tort victims at a steep
disadvantage, it did not invariably deny them justice. Conditions
varied widely across the nation and even in the South, and the
legal options available to blacks may have improved somewhat
after the 1920s. Further, those known to be 'good blacks' and those
who had white 'sponsors' were sometimes treated with benevolence. Those fortunate enough to obtain able white counsel and
get into court-at least on claims with no 'racial' overtone-could
sometimes succeed in winning relief. Indeed, black passengers
injured on trains owned by foreign corporations probably had a
relatively decent chance of prevailing. Reported release cases
involving blacks-few in number-suggest that southern and
border state courts would on occasion find in favour of blacks
who seemed truly deserving, especially if they were old, severely
injured, obviously overreached, and-perhaps-female.
The relatively small number of release cases involving blacks,
however, together with the evidence of general racial repression
0
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and discrimination, supports a simple conclusion. The overwhelming number of blacks settled their claims out of court,
received relatively low amounts of compensation, and dared challenge releases only rarely and only under unusually favourable
social circumstances. '[N]o one of us', recalled one southern
black, 'would have dared to dispute a white man's word.' 72

Using legal rules: policing and counter-crefiing behaviour
The pressure tactics of company agents and the minimal amounts
paid in settlements combined to make many judges deeply sceptical of releases signed shortly after accidents or in hurried circumstances. Frequently, they voided such agreements for fraud,
protecting claimants against many of the agents' most overt and
deceitful tactics. Given the need to prove 'intentional' misrepresentation and to meet a higher 'clear and convincing' standard of
proof, however, fraud was difficult to establish. Suspicious courts,
therefore, often turned to other theories to void dubious releases.
Increasingly, they used the doctrines of 'mistake' and 'mental
incompetence'. Both filled the middle ground where serious
doubts existed about an agent's actions but intentional misrepresentation had not clearly been shown. If misleading statements
had not been made intentionally, then they had necessarily been
made on the basis of an erroneous assumption of fact. In such
event, both parties were mistaken, and the intended agreement
had not been consummated. Similarly, if injured persons were not
able to act 'rationally', they lacked the mental competence to enter
into binding agreements. In either case, their contracts could be
set aside.
The irony, of course, was obvious. Corporate agents persistently sought out injury victims as soon as possible after accidents
and pressed them to sign releases immediately, regardless of their
physical and mental state and regardless of their ignorance about
their medical condition. The agents' goal was precisely to deal
with potential claimants while they were acutely vulnerable and
to pre-empt suits before they could become aware of the nature
of their injuries and obtain informed legal advice. Ignoring the
72
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essence of the social practice of corporate release-seeking, courts
used fictitious concepts of 'mistake' and 'competence'-sporadically and erratically-to try to limit its overall operation. They
drew essentially arbitrary lines to police the worst excesses of a
social practice that flooded broadly beyond their control.
While the law provided some escape hatches for those who
signed releases, it also provided corporate attorneys with powerful tools to defend many of their agents' most aggressive tactics.
The 'mere concealment' rule, for example, was often useful. Since
parties had a duty to read whatever agreements they signed,
written releases were not voidable for fraud if agents 'merely' concealed the contents as opposed to fraudulently misrepresenting
them.' [I]f by negligence and indifference to his own interests one
permits himself to be overreached', explained one court, 'the law
affords him no redress because his own conduct is blameworthy.' 73
Agents might succeed in securing legally binding agreements, in
other words, even though the written document they presented
contained terms that were different from those they had orally discussed or promised. If the injured person had an opportunity to
read the agreement, the 'mere concealment' rule could salvage a
release from a claim of fraud.
The 'statement of law' rule was equally serviceable .. 'The law
is presumed to be equally within the knowledge of all parties,'
declared an Ohio court, upholding a contested release. 'The
agent's opinion as to [the claimant's] legal rights, however strongly
stated, was not a misrepresentation of a fact for the consideration
of thejury.' 74 Thus, if agents couched their comments and exhortations in legal terms-the victim's 'fault', the company's nonliability, the legal significance of the alleged facts, or the elements
that a claimant would have to prove if she went to court-they
could stay within the law and probably ensure the validity of the
releases they obtained.
There was an even more comprehensive rule-the 'opinion'
rule-that was, understandably, of even greater utility. 'The true
rule is that the mistake must relate to either a present or past fact
or facts that are material to the contract of settlement', declared
the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 'and not to an opinion as to
73
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future conditions as the result of present known facts. ' 75 Artfully
phrased, or at least testified to, statements about a victim's prognosis, the efficacy of the company's safety precautions, the weight
due to the victim's testimony, the 'soundness of a doctor's evaluation, and other similar topics could be considered mere 'opinions'
and, hence, insufficient to sustain a claim of fraud. The rule was
especially serviceable in defending the optimistic prognoses of
company doctors and the glowing assurances of their claim
agents. :A physician's diagnosis is necessarily a matter of opinion',
wrote one court, 'except in cases where the ailment is external
and visible. ' 76 Though sensible in some contexts, the 'opinion'
rule encouraged ambiguities to thrive where conflicts of interest
inhered. The rule conferred a sweeping leeway on those whose
statements served two masters, and it imposed heavy burdens on
anyone who tried to challenge their craft. As long as agents cast
their statements as opinions, they could hover in the grey, and their
companies' attorneys could readily defend their actions.
Although courts often invoked the 'opinion' rule, they came
increasingly to limit it after the turn of the century. 77 They seemed
to grow more sensitive to the wiles of agents and the vulnerabilities of victims. 'The rule that a forecast of what will happen in
the future is merely promissory, and not a statement of existing
fact', explained the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1927, 'does not
apply, where the matter involved is peculiarly within the speaker's
knowledge.' The court upheld a ruling voiding a release because
the 'agent was in better position to know the facts about [plaintiff's medical condition] than the plaintiff'. 78 Similarly, the courts
seemed to become more willing to scrutinize records and find that
statements of opinion actually contained misrepresented or concealed 'present facts' that company doctors knew or should have
known. Such an interpretation allowed them to avoid the 'opinion'
rule altogether. 'The gist of fraudulent misrepresentation is the
producing of a false impression upon the mind of the other party',
explained the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 1913, 'and if this
"' Simpson v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway Co., 186 NW 1001, 1003 (Sup. Ct. Neb.
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result is actually accomplished the means of accomplishing it are
immaterial.' Affirming a judgment for plaintiff, the court noted
simply that the plaintiff was 'ignorant' and that 'the [company]
physician had superior knowledge'. 79
The courts increasingly recognized that experience, knowledge,
and craft allowed agents to posture their behaviour and frame
their statements in order to pressure victims to settle while at the
same time avoiding any obvious, or at least provable, overreaching. 80 They knew, too, that such artfully ambiguous behaviour
enabled company attorneys to characterize agents' actions in
legally defensible ways and thereby to maintain the validity of the
releases they secured. In the early twentieth century, by restricting such doctrines as the 'mere concealment' and 'opinion' rules,
many judges began trying to limit the ability of agents to accomplish by art what the law condemned in· principle.

The utility of releases and the scope
informal legal process

of the

As often as the courts voided releases, their decisions reached only
a small percentage of the agreements that companies. secured.
The major social significance of corporate release practices did
not occur in the frequent cases where courts voided agreements.
Rather, their principal impact occurred in three other classes of
cases where the releases prevailed.
The first was the large class of cases in which the courts did not
void releases even though the record suggested pressured circumstances, agent overreaching, or a victim who had little or no
understanding of his legal rights, medical condition, or the document presented. A New York appellate court refused to void a
release signed the day after a streetcar accident by an Bo-year-old
man who had suffered a dislocated shoulder, 81 and the Supreme
Court of New Jersey upheld a release for $roo signed by a passenger who had lost his arm while riding on a streetcar. 82
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The law of releases, in other words, did not grind exceedingly
small. '[C] ourts have shown a special disposition to sustain compromises of disputed claims', the New Hampshire Supreme Court
declared in 1915, 'often without much regard to the injustice
resulting.' 83 In Spritzer v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., for example, it
was uncontested that plaintiff had been injured in a train wreck,
thrown some IO or 15 feet from the train, carried unconscious to
a hospital, and placed on the floor on a stretcher in the company
of approximately 100 other victims of the same wreck. The plaintiff testified that he awoke a couple of hours later 'in a kind of
stupor', that he was 'cold because I was naked', and that he had
'a very terrible pain in my shoulder'. Finally, it was also uncontested that an agent approached the plaintiff while he was lying
on the floor and, approximately three hours after the wreck,
obtained a release. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld
the agreement on the ground that the plaintiff had not set forth
sufficient facts to show that he had been 'incompetent' when he
signed it. 84
The second class of cases where corporate release practices had
their major social impact included those where the courts refused
to void releases because the facts showed little or no evidence of
culpable overreaching. Those cases revealed, instead, simply that
the victims had acted most unwisely and-for whatever reasonhad settled for inadequate compensation. In these cases it made
no difference to the courts that the releases were signed within
days or weeks of injury, that the victims were without knowledgeable advisers, that they might have been influenced by mistaken diagnoses of company doctors, that they were injured more
severely than they had thought, or that they had probably had
little or no real understanding of the documents they signed. The
law protected releases that were free from certain identifiableand properly proven-types of overreaching, regardless of the
substantive unfairness of their terms or the gross inequality
between the parties. In 1914, for example, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas upheld a $10 release, signed two days after a train collision, and overturned a $2,500 jury verdict for a woman who had
received permanent internal injuries. 'The settlement was an
improvident one', the court acknowledged, 'but the plaintiff
n:i Mclsaac v. McMurrqy, 93 A. 115, 118 (Sup. Ct. NH 1915).
Spritzer v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 75 A. 256, 257 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 19w).
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entered into it in full possession of her senses and without the perpetration of any trick or fraud.' 85
The third class of cases where corporate release practices had
their major impact was the least visible but by far the largest and
most important. It was the class where the practice of organized
release seeking bore its true and most abundant harvest. It consisted of the vast and untold numbers of releases that were never
challenged in court and, hence, that never surfaced in the reported
'cases' or left traces in the judicial records. This third class was
founded on the beliefs of millions of tort victims that the releases
they signed had terminated any chance of legal recovery. The
major social impact of corporate settlement practices, in other
words, occurred outside the courts in a legal process that was
quick, effective, largely invisible, extremely profitable for the companies, and in every practical sense final and irremediable.
Exact measurement is impossible, but three basic facts suggest
the huge size of this third class. Millions of potential tort claims
arose every year; only a tiny percentage of them were resolved
judicially; and corporations maintained specialized departments
devoted to the goal of keeping adverse claims out of court. The
staggering disparity that existed between the number of potential
claims and the number of actual lawsuits establishes .that the
number of out-of-court dispositions was huge, and the extensive
and methodical nature of corporate practices suggests that
their claims departments must have been highly successful in settling out of court the overwhelming number of claims against
them. Those claimants who did challenge releases in court, therefore, almost certainly constituted but a minute fraction of the
total number of tort victims who signed corporate settlement
agreements.
Those who signed releases were, of course, severely disadvantaged in any subsequent attempt to assert their original claim.
Before they could even attempt to present their case on the merits
they would have to convince a court to void the release. That
required them to establish fraud, mental incompetence, or mutual
mistake-all of which required a substantial legal and practical
effort. Equally important, they faced a series of procedural
obstacles designed to protect the integrity of releases. Many
85
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jurisdictions required them to attack releases only in a separate
suit in equity. That requirement imposed on them the burden of
prosecuting two suits instead of one, a burden that increased their
costs, delayed their action on the merits, and often deprived them
of a jury on the critical questions at issue. Similarly, most courts
held claimants to a particularly high standard of proof. The need
to prevail by 'clear and convincing' evidence compounded
claimants' problems of proof, warning them of the need to locate
more and better witnesses and increasing their overall risk of ultimate failure. Finally, many courts required claimants to tender
back to defendants the money paid pursuant to the releases.
Though a seemingly minor procedural matter, the tender requirement could impose significant hardships on poorer claimants,
create a technical defence that could complicate or even bar their
action, and, in some cases at least, prevent those who lacked funds
from even getting into court.
That combination of legal and practical burdens undoubtedly
discouraged large numbers of injured persons who came to regret
their original settlements and belatedly considered the possibility
of taking legal action. The major de facto function of releases,
then, was not to block claims in court, but to dissuade claimants
from ever attempting to seek relief in any court.

Conclusion: peering outside the courts
An examination of corporate settlement practices during the
period from 1875 to 1945 suggests a number of conclusions. First,
the release cases support the proposition that tort victims as a
group received drastically discounted compensation for their
injuries, that corporations extracted substantial benefits from the
overall de facto process of claims disposition, and that the law
allowed-and in some ways encouraged-those results. It would
be impossible to quantify in any precise way the overall economic
impact of this claims disposition process, and any complete
accounting would have to include a range of discounting factors
and a variety of other costs, including those unfairly or improperly imposed on corporate defendants. Still, the organization,
numerical scope, and frequent ruthlessness of corporate settlement efforts suggest both that the methodical practice of release
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seeking constituted a highly effective way of minimizing overall
corporate costs and, further, that in its direct economic impact on
ordinary Americans the practice far overshadowed the importance of formal legal processes. The de facto system of corporate
release seeking harmed tort victims seriously and benefited corporations substantially, and it rendered the common law tort
system of the period highly inefficient. 86
Second, the study of corporate settlement practices highlights
the paradoxical and ambiguous nature of freedom of contract. A
wondrous instrument of liberty, creativity, and material progress,
contract was also a duplicitous and ruthless tool of coercion,
oppression, and exploitation. Too often its proponents-like its
detractors-saw only one side of its power. In the period from
1875 to 1945, largely congruent with the so-called 'Lochner era',
courts and commentators praised contract fervently, but they also
began to recognize its oppressive uses and tried increasingly to
limit them.
Third, the study also suggests more broadly that 'costs' are not
only unavoidable burdens that occur in all human endeavours but
also tools that arc sought out, created, magnified, and-above
all-used. 'Litigation' is neither an abstract nor wholly rule-bound
process. Rather, it comprises an infinite variety of actions-legal
and extra-legal as well-that clients and their attorneys take in
order to pressure their adversaries to discount or abandon their
claims. Corporate claim departments used the feared costs of litigation as a threat to persuade injured persons to discount or
forsake their claims. They used the burdens of actual litigation to
drive up the costs of pursuing those claims in order to serve the
same purpose. They used releases to add new obstacleseconomic and social-to the paths of tort victims who might
subsequently be tempted to revive their claims. The study of
litigation costs requires not only the study of generalized and economically inevitable 'transaction costs' but, more importantly, an
examination of 'strategic and tactical costs'-the costs that
lawyers discover, create, magnify, manipulate, and exploit.
Fourth, examination of corporate settlement practices shows
"" See I. I~ L. Png, 'Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care', Journal of Public Economics, 34 (1987), 61-85; A. Mitchell Polinsky, 'The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and
Trials', International Review of Law and Economics, 8 (1988), w9; Hylton, 'Litigation Costs and
the Economic Theory of Tort Law'.
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that both empirical studies of judicial caseloads and analytic theories about the 'selection' of cases for litigation, settlement, and
trial need to be deepened and contextualized. This study shows
that the interests and practices of institutions and groups helped
shape the contours of the out-of-court settlement process. Settlements did not occur randomly or accidentally. Rather, they had
distinct patterns depending on the nature of the parties and the
types of claims involved, and changing social factors were critical
in shaping those patterns and determining their practical results. 87
Understanding the nature and distribution of judicial caseloads
and the process by which cases were 'selected' for litigation or settlement requires an understanding of the social interests and institutions at work in any given historical period, not merely a logical
analysis of timeless probabilities about the litigation options of
abstracted 'plaintiffs' and 'defendants'. 88
Fifth, the study of corporate settlement practices also shows
that in some socio-legal contexts the ostensibly applicable substantive law may have little or no effect on the content of private
agreements. In spite of the law's varied impact in other contexts,
it had only an oblique and contingent relationship to the settlement agreements that corporate agents secured. Any study of the
social or economic impact of legal rules, in other words, must
examine both the extent to which various specific types of actors
were able to avoid those rules as well as the extent to which they
were able to use them in ways that went beyond their formal purposes. Legal rules were not self-executing, and in the great majority of disputes they were never judicially applied. Consequently,
there is no a priori reason to assume that they determined, shaped,
or even affected the out-of-court settlement of any individual case
or any particular class of cases. 89
Sixth, this study also highlights the fact that 'difficult' cases,
'ambiguous' situations, and 'disputed' facts do not always just
117
Sec, e.g., the discussion of 'social litigation systems' in Purcell, Litigation and Inequality,
248-50.
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Regulation of Settlements', Stanford Law Review, 4£i (1994), 1339;John C. Harsanyi, 'Games
with Incomplete Information', American Economic Review, 85 (1995), 291.
"'' e.g. Samuel R. Gross, 'The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation', Michigan Law Review, 85 (1987), 734-57. C( Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns,
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happen. Rather, they are often created and sometimes systematically cultivated. By seeking quick releases-by dealing with
injured persons when they were alone, in pain, without counsel,
under medication, and ignorant of the true extent of their
injuries-corporate agents chose to operate in a grey area where
ambiguities not only would abound by nature but could also thrive
by design. By artfully crafting their behaviour and statements to
remain arguably within the limits of certain legal rules-the
'opinion' rule or the 'mere concealment' rule, for example-they
could ensure that their actions would be legally defensible, regardless of the calculated de facto pressures or misconceptions they
generated. As organized and experienced parties, in other words,
corporate agents learned to play in the grey, and their companies
profited from the results. 90
Finally, though this study only glances at the formal law, it suggests the amazing constitutive power of legal language and doctrine. The law of releases helped define .and animate the ideology
of the 'free' and 'rational' economic individual. In a context where
organization, sophistication, and calculation confronted ignorance, confusion, desperation, and pain, the law presumed fairness, knowledge, capacity, and mutuality. Establishing those ideal
qualities as 'normal', it required parties who would attack releases
to prove by 'clear and convincing evidence' that their situations
were aberrational. Absent such proof of fraud, the law forced
them to speak of 'incompetence' and 'mistake' in situations where
neither of those concepts fairly or realistically captured what had
in truth occurred. Therein lay a powerful act of creation.
"" Some statutes tried to restrict the use of releases. Sec, e.g., Thorne v. Columbia Cab Co.,
3 NYS 537 (City Ct. NY 1938).

